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The Fed's New Model of Supervision for "Large Complex
Banking Organizations": Coordinated Risk-Based
Supervision of Financial Multinationals for International
Financial Stability
Cynthia Crawford Lichtenstein*
Ever since the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, l there has been
considerable debate among academic scholars concerning an appropriate
structure for overseeing the multinational purveyors of international financial
services . The proposed structures differ significantly. On one hand, there is the
present so-called international financial architecture3 of intergovernmental
committees with no discernible personality in international law. Committees such
as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision ("BCBS"4), International
Organization of Securities Commissions ("IOSCO"5) and the International
Association of Insurance Supervisors ("IAIS''6) produce sets of "principles" or
"best practice standards" on regulation and supervision having no legal force
until enacted domestically. On the other hand, there is a proposal for an
international agreement to implement harmonized standards and proposals for a
global regulator.9
* Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School, Fall 2001-
2004; Visiting Professor, Brooklyn Law School, Fall 2005; Professor Emeritus, Boston College Law School.
Special thanks for her research aid in the writing of this note are due to Michelle Parten, J.D. expected 2006,
George Washington University Law School.
1. See Cynthia Crawford Lichtenstein, Dealing with Sovereign Liquidity Crises: New International
Initiatives for the New World of Volatile Capital Flows to and from Emerging Markets, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV.
807 (1998) (describing the origins of this crisis from the point of view of an academic interested in the
interconnections between bank safety and soundness and international financial stability).
2. See JOHN EATWELL & LANCE TAYLOR, GLOBAL FINANCIAL RISK (New Press 2000).
3. See THE REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE (Rosa Lastra, ed., 2001)
(providing a collection of essays on this "architecture").
4. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, at http://www.bis.org/bcbs (last visited June 26,
2005).
5. International Organization of Securities Commissions, at http://www.Iosco.org (last visited June 26,
2005).
6. International Association of Insurance Supervisors, at http://www.Iaisweb.org (last visited June 26,
2005).
7. See Herbert V. Morais, The Quest for International Standards: Global Governance vs. Sovereignty,
50 KAN L. REV. 779 (2002) (describing the three "organisations" listed as well as a complete catalogue of other
international standards and their formulations in 2002).
8. Mario Giovanoli, A New Architecture for the Global Financial Market: Legal Aspects of
International Financial Standard Setting, in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY LAW: ISSUES FOR THE NEW
MILLENNIUM (Mario Giovanoli ed., 2000). Contra Cynthia Crawford Lichtenstein, Hard Law V. Soft Law:
Unnecessary Dichotomy? 35 INT'L LAW. 1433 (2001).
9. See EATWELL & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 208 (proposing to create a "World Financial Authority").
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The general question of whether nonbinding "standards" can achieve an
adequate level of compliance with international norms in any particular area of
international concern (for example, the environment, the international financial
system, oversight of nuclear proliferation) has spawned at least two important
books: "The New Sovereignty" by Abram and Antonia Chayes' ° and a collection
of significant essays by international law commentators titled "Commitment and
Compliance: The Role of Non-binding Norms in the International Legal
System."" This theoretical literature agrees on one fundamental proposition: the
safety and soundness of the internationally active financial conglomerates'2 that
link together'3 the economies of both the industrialized countries and the
emerging market countries into one global financial system are paramount to
international financial stability.
This belief in the necessary safety and soundness of internationally active
financial conglomerates for global financial stability is based upon the general
understanding of what is labeled "systemic risk' '14 ("SR"). As will be discussed
subsequently, 5 the U.S. central bank, which is the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System ("the Fed") and presently has supervisory functions for
certain types of depository institutions in the United States, including foreign
banking organizations in the United States, and is also the so-called "umbrella"
supervisor for the "financial services holding companies" authorized in 1999 by
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.' 6 The Fed regularly issues so called "Supervisory
Letters" to its examiners, supervisory officers at the regional Federal Reserve
10. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995).
11. OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS
IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000).
12. Note that the term used here is "financial conglomerates" rather than internationally active "banks."
As has been well written about by Joseph Norton & Christopher Olive, A By-Product of the Globalization
Process: The Rise of Cross Border Bank Mergers and Acquisitions-The U.S. Regulatory Framework, 56 BuS.
LAW. 591 (2001). That is, the consolidation of the large enterprises, whenever headquartered, engaged in cross-
border financial services has created a new class of financial services providers that dominate the global
financial markets. Since the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act (13 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377-78 (1994) repealed by
the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15
U.S.C.), the very large U.S. banks as Morgan-Chase and Citibank themselves the products of the wave of
banking mergers in the United States, have to group together under one "financial services holding company" a
combination of banking, securities and insurance services to rival the largest of the financial conglomerates
headquartered in other industrialized countries, regardless of whether those conglomerates are primarily
banking firms securities firms or insurance firms.
13. Space prevents a description of the linkages themselves. Trouble in the Clearing House International
Payments System (CHIPS) from the Herstatt affair is often cited as the original cause of the formation of the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
14. It must be acknowledged that not all commentators on the international financial scene believe in the
existence of "systemic risk," or at least that such risk might be occasioned by the failure of one of the
conglomerates. See, e.g., HAL SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS POLICY AND REGULATION
(11 th ed. 2004).
15. Id.
16. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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banks, and the domestic and foreign banking organizations it supervises. Each
Letter is identified by an SR number for the Division of Banking Supervision and
Regulation of the Fed.
On May 28, 2003, the Fed issued a supervisory letter ("SR letter"), 7 attaching
an Interagency Paper providing guidance ("sound practices") agreed upon by the
Fed, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), and the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (the primary supervisor for the U.S. federally
chartered banks or "national" banks) for the supervision of (1) ".. .organizations
that are deemed to present a type of systemic risk to U.S. financial markets ... "
(subsequently described as "core clearing and settlement organizations") and (2)
financial institutions "that play significant roles in critical financial markets."
The SR letter described these two types of organizations as ". . . pos[ing] higher
degrees of systemic risk should they be unable to recover or resume critical
activities that support critical markets."' 8
The SR letter defines the term "systemic risk," associated with the first type of
organization, as:
the risk that the failure of one participant in a transfer system or financial
market to meet its required obligations will cause other participants to be
unable to meet their obligations when due, causing significant liquidity
or credit problems and threatening the stability of financial markets. The
definition is drawn from a glossary of terms used in payment and
settlement systems. Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems,
Bank for International Settlements (2001).'9
Both the SR letter and the attached Interagency Paper define "firms that play
significant roles in critical financial markets," the second type of organization
mentioned above, as those that "... . clear or settle at least five percent of the
value of transactions in a critical market." 20 The Interagency Paper then declares
the "critical financial markets" to include the markets for federal funds, foreign
exchange, commercial paper, U.S. government and agency securities, and
corporate debt and equity securities.
To translate the Interagency Paper, the Fed, the SEC and the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency are announcing publicly that a firm participating in,
clearing or jointly setting at least five percent of the value of transactions in one
of the above listed markets that fails to meet its obligations as they become due,
threatens the stability of the U.S. financial system. The Interagency Paper
17. FRB: Supervisory Letter SR 03-9 on Interagency Paper on Sound Practices to Strengthen the Resilience
of the U.S. Financial System (May 28, 2003), at http://www.federareserve.gov/boarddocs/SRLETTERS/2003/SRO
309.htm (last visited June 26, 2005).
18. Id. 1.
19. Id. 4.
20. Id. l.
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suggests preparing back-ups for wide-scale disruption event. Indeed, the Paper
was prepared because of the September 11, 2001 ("9/11") terrorist attacks.
Nevertheless, the Letter and its attached Interagency Paper imply that a single
"large" (as defined) firm's insolvency could cause great havoc in both the
domestic and the international financial markets.
At this point, one may ask why is this SR letter and Paper addressing
financial market disruption when that is just the function normally taken on by
any country's central bank or other agency assigned the lender-of-last-resort
("LOLR") function in the economy. Indeed, in the afternoon of 9/11, the Fed, the
Bank of England and the European Central Bank (which, not having clear LOLR
authority itself, had convened by telephone all eleven of its national central
banks) all issued press releases assuring the markets that each Bank stood ready
to provide whatever liquidity the markets needed to ensure that the 9/11 tragedy
did not cause an international financial system failure. The Banks coordinated
successfully because the Fed of New York, acting with Chairman Greenspan,
heroically called its counterparts in London and Frankfurt to make arrangements
necessary to calm the critical international markets.
Unfortunately, however, in the case of a threat to the international system
from the failure of one huge multinational financial conglomerate, determining
which sovereign's LOLR will lead the "bailout" is not so obvious. The Basel
Concordat22 delineates supervisory authority to the central bank "responsible" for
the insolvency of a multinational bank present in more than one country.
However, it does not obligate any central bank to support the delinquent
institution. Indeed, for the first years of its existence, the Concordat was not
published for fear of encouraging "moral hazard."
Thus, we are left with the question: if certain large multinational financial
institutions responsible for more than five percent of the transactions in the
federal funds (a huge interbank dollar market), foreign exchange, commercial
paper, government bond, corporate debt, or equity securities markets present
"systemic risk" to the international financial system in the event of failure, how
does the "international community, 23 ensure "the safety and soundness" of these
conglomerates? It is at this point that I lay bare my conviction that the theoretical
debate as to the legal nature of the rules is unhelpful. Instead, what is helpful is
analyzing how effective supervisors are at overseeing these conglomerates. Since
the business of these conglomerates is complex financial engineering, they need
sophisticated oversight. Also important is ensuring that supervisors cooperate
when overseeing the conglomerate's business units, wherever located.
22. Basel Committee: Principles for the Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establishments-Basle Concordat
(May 1983), at http://www.bis.org/publlbcbsc3l2.pdf (last visited June 26, 2005).
23. Forgive the author for using a term so long out of use. I was educated at a time when that was the
term used to mean the cooperation of states to ensure that all those economic entities under each state's
jurisdiction were subject to regulation for whatever was the agreed upon "common good."
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At this point it is necessary to discuss the difference between "regulation"
and "supervision." 24 This difference might seem to present a tangential
discussion, but does not. Consider the ordinary business corporation in
jurisdictions with capital markets. If it raises capital by issuing securities to the
public, it is subject to regulation by the securities regulators who have
jurisdiction over the corporation pursuant to legislation or a supranational" entity
that purports to be prescribing the regulation. A government proscribes the
penalty to be imposed upon corporate entities for violating applicable regulations
(civil or criminal), and in some cases, such as mutual funds (which, after all, are
only ordinary business corporations whose business is to hold interests in other
corporations), the regulations will provide for periodic inspections of the books
and records of a fund, and require fund advisors to be certain that their funds are
adhering to proscribed regulations. In the case of the ordinary business
corporation in the United States, federal securities regulators do not usually
inspect the actual books and records of the corporation. Instead (and I believe this
is true of most other industrialized countries), there exist framework accounting
rules set by securities regulators proscribing how the corporation shall keep its
books and records and report to its shareholders. In the United States, regulators
permit the corporation issuing public securities to hire private auditors who
ensure that company "financial statements" accurately reflect true financial
condition. The hired auditors inspect and "certify" the financial statements
according to their own set of principles, customarily called "generally accepted
accounting principles," or "GAAP".
There are penalties, of course, for falsifying the books, but there is an
enormous amount of space, as we know from the Enron and WorldCom scandals,
for wiggle room--or, one might say, varying interpretations of GAAP. The
Sarbanes-Oxley legislation26 in the United States and other forms of revised
corporate regulation abroad have attempted to deal with some of the problems
arising out of this system, trying to ensure that investors are given accurate, or at
least not misleading, information about the financial condition of the corporation
they have invested in.2 However, the relevance of the Enron episode and its
aftermath to this thesis is only that the failure of Enron, although disastrous for
24. See Rosa Lastra, The Governance Structure for Financial Regulation and Supervision in Europe, 10
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 49 (2003) (defining "[s]upervision" as "oversight of financial firm' behaviour, in particular,
"Monitoring" and "[R]egulation" as rolemaking").
25. This term refers to law creating supranational entities that legislate for financial markets and
financial market actions headquartered or doing business in the confederation of states they cover. The prime
example is the European Union. See id. (describing how the EU is legislating financial services regulation).
26. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 129 U.S.C.).
27. Jeff Madrick, Economic Scene: Where Economists Stand, or Don't Stand, on the Issue of Corporate
Scandals, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2004, at C2 (noting that David A. Sneed of the University of Pennsylvania
School of Law thinks that Sarbanes-Oxley did not go far enough and that, among the other reforms proposed in
his ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY
CAME FROM (2004), he proposes that auditors would be assigned by the stock exchanges themselves).
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its employees, pensioners, creditors, and stock holders, did not have systemic
implications. The bankruptcies of Enron and Worldcom have not occasioned
international financial instability and, in fact, might be said to represent only the
government's failure to protect consumers.
Now consider the regulatory/supervisory system for depository institutions or
"banks" and their affiliates as best practices in the area as expressed in the Basel
Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision" issued by the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision ("BCBS") in 1997. First, banks are inspected
("examined") on-site by a regulator corps of examiners. The examination is
completed on a regular schedule. Examiners review the books and records
required to be on file, as well as mandatory reports (in accordance with
accounting rules set by the regulator, or "RAP," not by the accounting
profession) to ensure, to the extent possible, that the bank is not skirting any
regulation. In addition to the at least annual on-site examination that all federally
supervised banks must undergo in the United States, the Fed monitors (from the
figures in the required mandatory quarterly Call Reports referred to above) off-
site banks for which it is the regulator. To do this, the Fed uses highly
sophisticated and rigorously tested electronic systems. "Output from the systems
is used to accelerate the on-site examinations of institutions showing financial
deterioration, to identify the areas of most supervisory concern in those
institutions scheduled for examination; and to allocate the more experienced
examiners to troubled institutions." If the examiners, who in the United States are
specially trained, find rules violations or simply a financial situation in need of
immediate remedial action, the law gives them a panoply of remedial
enforcement tools. 29 One may ask here, why does such an expensive system of
ensuring compliance with law and regulation to say nothing of pre-failure
intervention used in connection with banks of deposit when, in the usual case, the
failure of an individual bank will not have systemic implications, either
nationally, or internationally? ° The answer, of course, has to do with the state
subsidy to the banks of the deposit guarantee scheme in the jurisdiction. To the
extent that taxpayers are ultimately on the hook for the bank's funding, the
government, as the voice of the taxpayers, will insist on influencing business
management.
But then we move to the next level, those financial conglomerates (with or
without a bank having guaranteed retail deposits at the center)31 whose possible
28. BASEL COMMrrrEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING
SUPERVISION (Sept. 1997), at http://www.bis.org/publbcbs30a.pdf (last visited June 26, 2005).
29. See Rebel A. Cole et al., FIMS: A New Monitoring System for Banking Institutions, 81 FED. RES.
BULL. 1 (1995).
30. We are not speaking here of depository institutions in emerging markets that fund themselves in the
interbank markets in foreign currencies, thus incurring transfer risk and creating considerable risk for their
country's macro-economy. See Lichtenstein, supra note 1.
31. At the present time, Fed supervision of financial conglomerates is limited to those that do include a
depository bank, but as will be recalled from the text at note 17, the supervisor of stand alone U.S. securities
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failure is considered by the industrialized countries' central banks to have
internationally significant systemic implications.32
This is the group of entities (at least those with a bank at the center at the
time) that the BCBS originally focused on, "large internationally active banking
organizations," when promulgating (if such a term may be used for a group with
no identifiable legal personality) the Basel Concordat3 in 1983 and the Basel
Accord ("Basel I" and amendments) of 1988. 3 This is the group of entities, as
firms, the SEC, has joined in the issuance of the Interagency Paper describing "sound practices" to "strengthen
the resilience of the U.S. financial system," the paper that defines "systemic risk" and, in effect, admits that
securities firms of the size described in the Paper can also present systemic risk. See also the justification for
prudential supervision of large securities firms (as opposed to conduct of business rule-making for consumer
protection purposes) in Michael Taylor, "Twin Peaks." A Regulatory Structure for the New Century (Centre for
the Study of Financial Innovation 1995), at 4 "Banks have traditionally been seen as the key systemically
important institutions. However, as the Promised report of 1992 observed [fn omitted], a wide range of
financialfirms can now create potentially systemic problems (emphasis in the original), given the importance of
non- bank financial firms-securities houses, insurance companies, trusts and others-in the OTC ("over-the-
counter") derivatives markets, including as market makers in some cases." See also infra text at note 45.
This understanding that all forms of financial multinationals, whether or not the conglomerate has a
"bank" at its center, may be systemically important has now permeated the work of the international financial
institutions, the IMF and the World Bank, to spread implementation of the Basel Core Principles, supra n., to
their client states. CESARE CALARI & STEFAN INGRES, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND WORLD BANK,
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BASEL CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION, EXPERIENCES,
INFLUENCES, AND PERSPECTIVES, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/maebcore/ 2002/092302.pdf at
25, 1 49:
Developments in financial markets: Three main developments in the financial markets since
1997 need to be taken into consideration in review of the BCPs and the Methodology:
continued intemationalisation of financial markets, the blurring of boundaries between the
traditional financial sub-sectors banking, insurance and securities, and acceleration of
financial sector consolidation. All these changes demonstrate an increasing need for
cooperation and coordination in regulations and practices between domestic and international
financial supervisory agencies to establish a consistent group-wide framework. This would
comprise supervisors from different sectors and countries, which can effectively supervise a
multinational financial conglomerate.
32. One should note here that at least as of the year 2000, Fed did not seem to be openly justifying the
"umbrella supervision" of financial conglomerates applying for financial holding company ("FHC")status under
the Bank Holding Company Act 12 U.S.C. § 1842 et seq. as amended by the Gramn-Leach Bliley Act, supra
note 12, to enable the conglomerates to affiliate with securities and insurance firms given to Fed by the GLB
Act on the grounds of international systemic stability. Instead, Fed in its Supervisory Letter issued on August
15, 2000 on its "Framework for Financial Holding Company Supervision," SR.00-13 (SUP), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs.srletters/2000/SR001 3 .htm, August 15, 2000, stated: "The Federal
Reserve, as umbrella supervisor, will seek to determine that FHCs are operated in a safe and sound manner so
that their financial condition does not threaten the viability of its depository institution subsidiaries." Fed does
not spell out the possible consequences of such a lack of "viability," but this paper will be spelling out how the
risk based supervision process for "LCBOs" (read "FHCs") certainly tracks the Basel concept of risk-based
capital adequacy standards as rearticulated in Basel II, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A revised Framework and that Fed has announced
will only be applied to a "small number of large, internationally active U.S. banking organizations," Joint Press
Release, June 26, 2004. The Supervisory Letter is required reading for anyone interested in the issue of Fed as
"umbrella supervisor."
33. Supra note 22.
34. BASEL COMMITTEE: INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL
STANDARDS (Apr. 1998), at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbscl I l.pdf (last visited June 26, 2005).
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enlarged by the addition of the groups of systemically important securities houses
and equivalent insurance affiliates, for whom the Fed's methods of supervision
and examination have changed significantly with the issuance by the Fed in 1997
of its "Handbook" titled: "Framework for Risk-Focused Supervision of Large
Complex Institutions," as the attachment to SR 97-24 (SUP) (Oct. 27, 1997)."
The remainder of this paper will concentrate on a detailed, if not overly
technical, description of the Fed's new approach to supervising large complex
banking organizations ("LCBOs"), whether the entities are headquartered in the
United States, with the Fed as the home country supervisor or abroad with the
Fed as the supervisor of the U.S. office (host supervisor) 6 The rationale for the
Fed's development of the new program of supervision should be clear from the
perhaps lengthy description previously given and that follows of LCBOs changed
role in systemic risk. For an excellent description of both how entities come to be
classified as warranting the new approach to supervision and a history of the
program's development, one should refer to the paper published in 2001 in the
Federal Reserve Bulletin by Lisa M. DeFerrari and David E. Palmer, both of the
Fed's Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation (DeFerrari and Palmer).37
The curious thing about this program and its corollary, the special program
for supervision of FBOs described in footnote 56, is how little attention the
government has paid to the revised-and very different-program of supervision
in the legal literature. De Ferrari and Palmer are not law professors, nor does the
Federal Reserve Bulletin qualify as a law review, regardless of how useful it is to
financial services practitioners seeking background. The author has found only
one law review piece that refers to the relevant Supervisory Letters and attempts
to describe the new system: Joseph J. Norton, A Perceived Trend in Modern
International Financial Regulation: Increasing Reliance on a Public-Private
Partnership ("Norton").38 Unfortunately, Norton seems to misconceive the
purpose and the mechanics of the new supervisory approach because he theorizes
a form of regulatory capture of the supervisory authorities by what he calls "elite
banks." Norton posits that ".... the larger and more influential elite banks have
considerably greater financial and intellectual resources at their disposal than the
government agencies, in terms of expertise in dealing with increasingly complex
35. Federal Reserve Supervisory Letter SR 97-24 (SUP) (Oct. 27, 1997), available at http://www.federal
reserve.Gov/boarddocs/SRLETTERS/1997/SR9724.htm.
36. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA), Pub.L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat.
2236, placed supervision of all foreign bank entry, whether directly by offices of the foreign bank licensed by a
state banking authority or the Comptroller of the Currency or by the creation of a banking subsidiary chartered
by either a state or under federal law, in Fed. As is noted in DeFerrari and Palmer, infra note 37, at 55, ...
large FBOs account for approximately one third of the banking organizations in [Fed's] LCBO program."
37. See Lisa M. DeFerrari & David E. Palmer, Supervision of Large Complex Banking Organizations,
87 FED. RES. BULL 47 (2001).
38. See Joseph J. Norton, A Perceived Trend in Modem International Financial Regulation: Increasing
Reliance on a Public-Private Partnership, 37 INT'L LAw.43 (2003).
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and global risk exposures,"39 and he describes the new form of supervision and its
oversight of internally generated econometric risk measurement models as
"privatisation." According to Norton, the article ".... explores the notion of a
'risk-focused' supervisory regime coupled with a 'self-regulatory' regime (i.e.,
'qualified self-regulation') [presumably the internal models] as a modern
manifestation of and a trend towards 'a quasi or partial privatization' of what
traditionally would have been the exclusive domain of government. '' °
Moreover, Norton has not given sufficient credence to the mechanics and
staffing of the new form of supervision for LCBOs. In his article, he asks some
very good conceptual questions concerning banking authorities' decisions to
intervene (through monetary, supervisory, or regulatory policy) in "periods of
systemic risk, distress, crisis and failure.",4' The paragraph with these questions
(replicated) below in footnote 41) ends with the statement: "These questions
should be cautiously explored in developing future reforms to large bank
supervision and capital adequacy frameworks. 42
This author could not agree more with these conceptual questions, but,
contrary to Norton, believes that the Fed's new system supervising LCBOs, as set
out in SR 99-15 (Sup)4 3 (to be discussed below and as described in De Ferrari &
Palmer") has been designed specifically to respond to these questions. It is the
thesis of this paper that the new framework, rather than being a "privatisation" of
supervision or a "partnership" of the "elite" banks and their U.S. central bank
supervisor (the Fed), as argued by Norton, is the attempt by the supervisor to
ensure, by its processes and staffing of supervision of LCBOs, that it is setting
the supervision agenda for itself, other U.S. supervisors and foreign supervisors,
and that it is attempting to ensure the ultimate responsibility of a central bank.
39. Id. at 51.
40. Id. at 44.
41. Id. at 52. These questions are:
First, how and on the basis of what information should elite bank risk management and internal
control systems be continuously supervised and evaluated by banking authorities over time?
Second, how can the credit, market, and operational risks undertaken by an elite bank be
measured and its capital adequacy evaluated in real time? Third, how can elite bank senior
management be held accountable for meaningful deficiencies in risk management and internal
control systems and for capital inadequacy? Fourth, how should such accountability be defined
and determined (in terms of regulatory enforcement or public disclosure or both), and what is
the objective of holding persons or institutions accountable? Fifth, what should be the standard
for holding such senior management accountable for risk management and internal controls
failures that result in substantial losses to the banks and/or jeopardize the national or global
banking and financial systems?
Id. at 53.
42. Id. at 53.
43. Supra note 37.
44. Id.
45. See also Karen Shaw Petrou, Address before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
of the United States Senate (June 18, 2003), in BASEL 1I: BABY IN THE BATH WATER WORTH SAVING, available
at http://www.fedfin.com//presscenter/Petrovsenatetestimony06l803.pdf. Granted that Ms. Petrou is in effect a
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In conjunction with reading Ms. Petrou's testimony,46 one should consider
the Fed's Press Release in re Supervisory Letter Concerning Capital Adequacy
(July 1, 1999) and its attached Supervisory Letter whose subject is entitled
"Assessing Capital Adequacy in relation to Risk at Large Banking Organizations
and Others with Complex Risk Profiles," reprinted in "SWAPS and other
derivatives in 1999," PLI Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series,
November 1999. 4' The Press Release states that the attached Letter grew out of a
"recent supervisory review of internal capital management processes" at several
LCBOs. The Press Release also reiterates that "[s]upervisory letters are the
primary means by which the Federal Reserve communicates key policy directives
to its examiners, supervisory staff, and the banking industry," and states as "the
long-term goal[s]" of the attached Supervisory Letter to encourage broader
adoption of sound practices in internal analysis of capital adequacy, to promote
further innovation and enhancements by the industry in this area, and to integrate
better such internal analysis into the supervisory process."
The Letter itself directs supervisors and examiners (the difference is in rank,
with the "supervisors" being the officers of the regional Federal Reserve Banks
and of the Fed in D.C. who are in charge of the supervision process, and the
"examiners" being the government employees who are actually carrying out the
examination process on the ground or through the electronic process ".... to
evaluate internal [emphasis added] capital management processes to judge
whether they meaningfully tie the identification, monitoring, and evaluation of
risk to the determination of the institution's capital needs." , To support such an
evaluation, the Letter continues by detailing what it calls "the fundamental
elements of a sound internal capital adequacy analysis" as well as "the key areas
of risk to be accompanied by such analysis." In particular, examiners, '[u]sing as
a guide the elements of sound practice described in this SR Letter," are directed
to "evaluate whether the organization is making adequate progress in assessing
lobbyist for the "elite" Norton writes about, this author nevertheless finds her writings analytical and
persuasive. In her Senate testimony, Petrou is arguing against the inclusion of a capital charge for so-called
"operational risk "in Pillar I of the proposed revised Capital Accord upon which the BCBS has been laboring
since 1999. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL
MEASUREMENTS AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK (June 2004), available at www.bis.org/
publlbcbsl07.htm (last visited June 26, 2005) (Basel II). As Petrou summarizes in her testimony, the three
pillars of Basel II are "improved regulatory capital standards, better supervision and more disclosure." Op. Cit
supra, at p. 4. She goes to say: "If Pillars 2 and 3 work well, then Pillar 1-the capital standards-need not be
as formulaic and far-reaching as currently proposed because supervisors will have ample tools to tailor
regulatory capital to individual circumstances and markets will know when this isn't being done." Id. The
United States has excellent supervisory standards and ample authority "to discipline banks for problems that
have nothing to do with capital standards." She concludes (on p. 5): "U.S. regulators, I think, could have done
much for the global financial system and avoided many of the pitfalls in Basel II if more attention had been paid
to exporting our strict supervisory standards and their effective enforcement."
46. See supra note 45.
47. 1147 PLI/Corp 281.
48. Id. at 285.
49. Id. at 288.
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 18
its capital needs on the basis of the risks arising from its business activities,
rather than focusing its internal processes primarily on compliance with
regulatory standards.. . ,"0 The Supervisory Letter contains highly sophisticated
direction as to how a "sound internal capital adequacy analysis" is
accomplished," and directs examiners to review a bank's "analysis, including the
target levels of capital chosen, to determine whether it is sufficiently
comprehensive and relevant to the current operating environment."5
One may contrast the Fed's instructions in this Supervisory Letter issued in
1999 with Norton's conclusion in his 2003 piece that "[T]he 'risk-focused
supervision' concept essentially redirects responsibility and accountability for the
design, development and implementation of risk management and internal
control systems to the elite banks themselves, subject to general and objective
(and, at times, subjective) standards for such systems established by the banking
authorities, and to supervisory oversight of such systems."53
The initial Supervisory Letter (SR 97-24 (SUP)) attaching the new
"Handbook" titled "Framework for Risk Focused Supervision of Large Complex
Institutions," explains that "[O]ver the last several years, a major strategic
initiative of the Federal Reserve has been to develop and implement an
examination and supervision program for large domestic and foreign banking
organizations that focuses more effectively on an organization's principal risks
and on its internal systems and processes for managing and controlling these
risks."' The Fed further explains that the "... best practice in the supervision and
regulation of banking organizations is an evolving concept that must continually
respond to important developments in banking, ... the changing nature of risk-
taking... and the globalization and integration of financial institutions and
markets."55 It is notable that this change in the Fed's conception of supervision
and examination applies to both large domestic and foreign banking
organizations.56 The distinction that the Fed now makes in its supervision since
50. Id.
51. Id. at 291.
52. Id. at 296.
53. Norton, supra note 38, at 53.
54. Federal Reserve Supervisory Letter SR 97-24 (sup) (Oct. 27, 1997), available at http://www.federal
reserve.gov/boarddocs/SRLetters/1997/SR9724.htm.
55. Id.
56. Supervision and examination of foreign banking organizations (FBO's) of course, necessitated
certain refinements of the new initiative. SR 00-14 (SUP), Oct. 23, 2000 describes the enhancement of "the
Interagency Program for Supervising the U.S. Operations of Foreign Banking Organizations" originally
established in March 1995. That program differs from the Risk Focused Framework in that it provides for a
process entitled the "Strength of Support Assessment" (SOSA), meaning an evaluation of the organization's
(that is, the foreign banking organization-the top parent abroad, the foreign equivalent of a domestic FHC)
"ability to provide financial, liquidity and management support to its U.S. operations." Federal Reserve Board
Division of Banking Supervision & Regulation, Enhancements to the Interagency Program for Supervising the
U.S. Operations of Foreign Banking Organizations, ii. (Aug. 8, 1999), available at http://www.federal
reserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2000/SR0014.htm. The forward to the "Handbook," see supra note 54, in its
third paragraph notes specifically that the new initiative in examination incorporates the U.S. operations of
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issuing the 1997 Handbook is not between domestic and foreign owned
depository institutions, but between "community banks" and LCBOs. As the
Forward to the "Handbook" states: "The complexity of financial products,
sophistication of risk management systems (including audit and internal
controls), management structure, and geographic dispersion of operations are but
a few of the areas in which large institutions may be distinguished from
community banks. 57
Interestingly, at the same time that the Fed was developing both its program
for supervision of foreign banking organizations in the United States58 and its new
initiative for risk-focused supervision, 9 September 1997, William J. McDonough,
at that time President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, delivered a
speech before the Institute of International Bankers. He argued for the Fed as the
umbrella supervisor of whatever "financial modernization" Congress might enact
(which eventually, in 1999, Congress did with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Acte) on
the ground that, as reported by Banking Policy Report, ".... financial...
conglomerates large enough to threaten the stability of the financial system should,
at a minimum, be subject to some form of consolidated supervisory oversight that
has market stability as its guiding principle.' 6' The Report goes on to say that
"McDonough said bank regulators should instead focus on promoting financial
market stability and minimizing systemic risk ... [rather than protecting the
deposit insurance fund]. 'Supervisors need to come up with a contemporary model
for overseeing the activities of financial conglomerates,' he said. It has become
increasingly difficult for supervisors and the industry to distinguish between the
business of banks and securities firms .... Given these linkages, the failure of
either a major bank or securities firm could have systemic effects on the financial
FBO's, and warns that since the "Federal Reserve is a host country supervisor rather than the home country
consolidated supervisor ... the risk-focused examination process needs to be carried out within the framework
of the FBO program which fully accounts for these differences and was agreed to with other supervisors in
1995." The enhancement to the supervision of FBOs in 2000 carried out the approach of the Risk-Focused
Supervision initiative to interaction with senior management of the large institutions the initiative focused on,
that is, ".... the Federal Reserve and other U.S. bank supervisory agencies have agreed to begin informing both
the FBO's senior management and its home country supervisor of the foreign bank's SOSA ranking." The
author understands from a former supervisor that not only is the home country supervisor informed of the
FBO's SOSA ranking, but that the U.S. supervisors and the foreign supervisors then talk about any
discrepancies between the U.S. assessment of the strength of the FBO's finances, liquidity and management and
what the foreign supervisor is seeing in its supervision and examination. That, however, is another paper for
another day.
57. See supra note 54, at i (Forward to the attached Handbook available at http://www.federalreserve.
gov/boarddocs/SRLetters/1997/sr9724a1 .pdf).
58. See supra note 56.
59. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. See also Yokoi-Arai, The Evolving Concept of
Operational Risk and Its Regulatory Treatment, 9 WTR L & Bus. REv. AM. 105, 118 (2003) (succinctly
summing up the change in approach, stating, "The supervisory trend of industrialized countries is evolving from
balance sheet assessments to risk-based analysis.").
60. Supra note 16.
61. Aspen Law & Business, Fed Reasserts Position on Designating an Umbrella Supervisor, 16 No. 19
BANKING POL'Y REP. 8 (1997).
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system., 62 Thus, both understanding the need for supervision and what the nature
of that supervision should be was changing in the late 1990s, not only for the Fed's
most senior officials, but also for perspicacious academics.
In 1995, the Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation, a self-described
London "non-profit think-tank," published a paper by Michael Taylor, formerly
with the Bank of England and at that time director of a course in financial
services regulation at London Guidhall University, entitled "'Twin Peaks': A
Regulatory Structure for the New Century., 63 At the time when Taylor's was
preparing his paper, the United Kingdom was debating Britain's financial
supervisory structure; a debate that would culminate, under the leadership of
Prime Minister Blair, in a thorough revision of the then Financial Services Act.
The Act abolished many of the self-regulatory bodies set up by that Act and
shifted bank supervision from Bank of England to a newly formed "Financial
Services Authority" (which not coincidentally also took over the functions of the
Securities and Investment Board, the former U.K. securities regulator).
Michael Taylor added to the deliberation by stressing in this paper two
separate aims for supervising financial intermediaries: "to ensure the soundness of
the financial system" and "to protect consumers from unscrupulous operators."
6
These two goals constituted the "twin peaks" (quite discrete peaks) of the title of
his paper. His thesis suggests that U.K. financial supervision/regulation be divided
into two separate agencies, one, the Financial Stability Commission to
"ensure ... the soundness of the system, the capital adequacy of banks and control
of risk" and the other, the Consumer Protection Commission to "enforce conduct
of business regulation to ensure that the consumer receive[s] a fair and honest
service. 65
For the purposes of this paper, the most interesting part of "Twin Peaks" is
Taylor's first of four main components of his ". . . case for assigning
responsibility for the financial soundness of all major financial institutions to a
single agency" (emphasis in original).66 He lists as those components the ideas
that "a wide range of financial firms must now be regarded as systemically
important; existing regulatory requirements raise issues of competitive
equality... ; the rise of financial conglomerates makes a group-wide
perspective.., essential; and finally, there is a need to pool the rare expertise
which is necessary adequately to supervise increasingly sophisticated trading
operations. 67
62. Id. In June, 2003, McDonough became the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the U.S. Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board established by the Sarbanes - Oxley Act of 2002, supra note 26.
63. Supra note 31.
64. Id. at i, The Executive Summary.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 4.
67. Id.
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It is this fourth component that is clearly perspicacious. Taylor fleshes out
this notion of pooling expertise by writing later in the paper:
A final consideration also derives from the increased emphasis on
assessing the adequacy of the internal risk control systems (including
value-at-risk models) and the need to understand the global risk profile
of complex financial groups. [Footnote omitted]. This is already creating
a demand for high levels of expertise on the part of supervisors and
regulators - a demand which is likely to expand still further in the
coming years. Given the inability of the regulatory bodies to compete
with the remuneration offered by the commercial sector, this expertise is
always likely to be in short supply. Thus, there is a strong case for
pooling the presently thinly-spread regulatory expertise to undertake the
difficult task of adequately supervising sophisticated risk management
systems and to develop the techniques necessary to come to grips with
the issues posed by financial conglomerates. 6
In a subsequent section entitled, "Governance and staffing of the Commissions,"
Taylor further explicates his notion of the need for rare expertise amongst
supervisors of the systemically important international financial conglomerates:
Each Commission should be responsible for recruiting its own staff,
since the knowledge and expertise they will require will be markedly
different. The staff of the Financial Stability Commission will need to
have (or to acquire) the skills used by auditors and risk management
specialists, and should include at least some with the mathematical
background to be able to understand and assess the most advance risk
management models. By contrast, the Consumer Protection Commission
will require staff with a predominately legal or accounting background,
including at least a few who are skilled in forensic accountancy. This
contrast in skills is already apparent within the regulated firms
themselves, where risk management specialists and compliance
professionals are involved in different aspects of regulation (prudential
and conduct of business respectively).69
This same notion of the need for expert staffing of the supervisory teams
examining LCBOs, what Taylor calls "complex financial groups," permeates 0
the Fed's new supervisory system.
68 Id. at 11-12.
69 Id. at 12.
70. Cf supra note 38, at 49 (stating, "banking authorities also generally lack the expertise or resources
available to elite banks and, therefore, have the incentive to seek out the counsel and advice of constituent elite
banks on issues pertaining to monetary, supervisory, and regulatory policies prior to or during their
implementation").
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Turning to the specifics of the new supervision process as explicated both in
DeFerrari & Palmer,7' and in the Fed's 1999 SR letter, ". . . build[ing] upon the
Federal Reserve's existing risk-focused supervision program by providing more
specific guidance on the applicability of this program to LCBOs. 72 DeFerrari &
Palmer provide a chart73 comparing traditional bank examinations with risk-
focused supervision for LCBOs, one of the differences in the latter system being
that "[linstitutions are assigned designated supervisory teams. The teams are
supplemented with specialists, who may be drawn from across the Federal
Reserve System. 74 The article in the text explains that the assigned designated
supervisory team is "a full-time team of Federal Reserve supervisors"75 for each
LCBO. The team is responsible for developing and maintaining the Fed's
"supervisory plan" (the nature of which is explained in the article) for the
particular LCBO, and generally comprises four to ten seasoned examiners and
analysts. The team for each LCBO is "headed by a very senior examiner or
Reserve Bank official" called the "central point of contact" or CPC for the
particular LCBO. The CPC "coordinates the development and execution of the
supervisory strategy for the institution. 76 In addition "teams with technical
expertise on such issues as credit-risk modeling, payment systems, and
information technology are available to supplement individual LCBO teams."77
The LCBO's Fed team does not work alone. DeFerrari & Palmer stress that
since the lead bank of an LCBO may have a primary supervisor (for example, the
Comptroller of the Currency if the lead bank is a national bank or a foreign
supervisor if the lead bank in the LCBO is a FBO) other than the Fed,
coordination of the team with the LCBO's primary supervisor is very important.
The two authors point out that:
"[I] n addition, systemic risk is associated with the potential disruption of
the operations of large banks. Thus, the Federal Reserve needs to know
more about the activities within large insured depository institutions than
can be derived from public information or from the reports of the
primary bank supervisor, and it also needs to have more than ad hoc
71. Supra note 37.
72. Fed. Reserve Supervisory Letter SR 99-15 (SUP) (June 23, 1999), available at http://www.federal
reserve.gov/boarddocs/SR letters/1999/SR 9915.htm.
73. DeFerrari & Palmer, supra note 37, at 51.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 53.
76. Id. The author was informed by a former examiner that not a business day goes by without some
member of its team being present at Citibank. Given this level of supervision and examination, one may ask
why the asset management business in Japan managed to do so violate Japanese law that it was expelled from
Japan. See Timothy O'Brien & Landon Thomas Jr., It's Cleanup Time at Citi, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2004, § 1, at
1. Perhaps the answer is simply that "private banking," managing the money of very rich individuals, does not
entail "systemic risk," however much violation of Japan's consumer protection regulation may put Citibank's
reputation at risk, and so was not within Citi's team's remit.
77. Id. at 50.
2005 /New Model of Supervision for "Large Complex Banking Organizations"
contact with the primary bank supervisor. Similarly, the primary bank
supervisor needs information about the activities of a bank's parent
company and its nonbank affiliates to be aware of, and address as a
necessary, threats to the soundness of the bank that may arise from
elsewhere in the consolidated organization.""T
Thus, in effect, the Fed seems to consider itself the lead LCBO supervisor,
regardless of the legal structure of the organization. DeFerrari & Palmer continue
their piece by describing the Fed's own structural changes to ensure that it has
the capacity to support adequately its LCBO teams. They describe Coordinated
Supervisory Exercises, as essentially a kind of internal simulation of an
examination or sharing of knowledge from examination work at a number of
LCBOs intended to deepen understanding of inherent risk in specific business
activities, develop examiner expertise, and identify gaps and weaknesses in
existing Federal Reserve System policies and procedures.79
In addition DeFerrari & Palmer describe the establishment of competing
centers, housed at designated Reserve Banks, and intended to "... develop and
maintain Federal Reserve System expertise in specific technical areas in an
efficient manner."' The resemblance between these descriptions of the Fed's
supervisory process for LCBOs and Michael Taylor's proposed Financial
Stability Commission is obvious.
As for the Fed's own SR Letter on the subject, SR 99-15 (SUP),' much of its
content has been already covered by the description of DeFerrari & Palmer.82
What the Letter adds is its specific statement 3 that the new emphasis on
assessing internal policies and processes for identifying, measuring, monitoring,
and controlling risks is in addition to "sufficient transaction testing to determine
a financial institution's compliance with sound banking practices. .. ."84 This
paper began with the observation that the "ordinary business corporation is not in
the ordinary course examined at all and that the truthfulness of the data it releases
to its regulators and the public depend upon the after-the-fact criminal penalties
for fraud and lying." One hopes that this paper has demonstrated that, at least for
78. Id. at 54. In this connection, consider what Fed has to say in SR 00-13 (SUP), supra note 32, about
what supervisory staff may do with respect to obtaining a "specialized report" from a "functionally regulated
subsidiary." Essentially, a regulator is speaking for the SEC in the case of an investment bank subsidiary of the
conglomerate. Id. at 6. The regulator outlines the circumstances under which Fed "may examine," that is, send
its own staff in, such a subsidiary. Id.
79. DeFerrari & Palmer, supra note 37, at 56.
80. Id.
81. Supra note 72.
82. See generally DeFerrari & Palmer, supra note 37.
83. Contrary to the allegation in Norton, supra note 38, that the "Base Commit other systemically
important conglomerates have redirected "examination techniques to emphasize risk management and internal
central systems, as opposed to determining through transaction testing and other static means whether a bank or
LCBO is operating in a safe and sound manner at a given time." Id. at 46.
84. SR 99-15 (SUP), supra note 72, at 2.
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those financial conglomerates that are classified by the Fed as LCBOs because of
the importance of their safety and soundness to international financial stability,
exactly the opposite is true. The Fed has tried to develop a supervisory
framework with its LCBO supervision program that is sufficiently flexible and
grounded in the supervisory system's expertise so as to keep the supervisor
genuinely in touch with the on-going risks of the business of each LCBO so
supervised and in control of the efficacy of the institution's own internal models
of risk management. So far, it has worked. One can only hope that the system
will continue to do so as these LCBOs, representing the circulatory system of the
global financial markets, meet greater and greater financial stability challenges.

